Unionisation structure and strategic foreign direct investment by Arijit Mukherjee & Kullapat Suetrong
       
   research paper series 











Research Paper 2007/22 
 

















The Centre acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust            
under Programme Grant F114/BF   
 
The Authors 
Arijit Mukherjee is an Associate Professor in the School of Economics, University of 
Nottingham and an Internal Fellow in the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and 
Economic Policy. Kullapat Suetrong is a Postgraduate Research Student in the School of 

























We thank Hartmut Egger, Catia Montagna, Zhihong Yu, and the seminar participants at the 
Univeristy of Nottingham and the 6
th postgraduate conference for useful comments and 
suggestions. A. Mukherjee gratefully acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme 
Trust under Programme Grant F114/BF. K. Suetrong thanks the Royal Thai Government for 
financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.  Unionisation structure and strategic foreign direct investment 
 
by 





It is often argued that if the substitutability between workers is sufficiently high, labour is better off 
under a centralised labour union than under decentralised unions. We show that this may not be the case 
in an open economy with foreign direct investment as the incentive for outward FDI is higher under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions. If the number of firms undertaking FDI under a 
centralised union is higher than under decentralised unions, their wage rates charged by the labour union 
and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, and the 
comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. We also show that there are situations 
where both the domestic industry and the labour unions prefer decentralised unions over a centralised 
union.  
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6.  Conclusions Non-Technical Summary  
It is often argued that if the substitutability between workers is sufficiently high, labour is better off under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions. In this paper, we argue against the conventional 
wisdom and show that this is not always the case in an open economy with foreign direct investment. We 
consider an economy where the firms from a home (or domestic) country and a foreign country compete 
in the foreign country. The firms in the home country may serve the foreign country either through exports 
or FDI and the labour market in the home country is unionised, whereas the foreign labour market is 
perfectly competitive. 
We show that labour can be better off under decentralised unions than under a centralised union if the 
incentive for outward FDI under a centralised union is higher than under decentralised unions. If the 
number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is higher than under decentralised unions, their 
wage rates charged by the labour union and the union utility may be higher under decentralised unions 
than under a centralised union, and the comparison may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. 
We also show that a conflict of interest between the domestic industry and the labour unions may not 
always arise. There are situations in which both parties prefer a decentralisation than a centralisation 
structure.  
 
 1. Introduction 
Labour markets differ substantially between countries with respect to the degree of 
centralised wage setting (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, Moene and Wallerstein, 1997, 
Flanagan, 1999 and Wallerstein, 1999). A decentralised wage setting is often contrasted 
with a centralised wage setting.
1 While the centralised wage setting is egalitarian in 
nature and generally makes the workers better off if the workforce consists of sufficiently 
substitutable workers (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 and Davidson, 1988),
2 it is commonly 
believed that the rigidity associated with this system is generally bad for overall 
economic performance (Nickell, 1997 and Siebert, 1997).  
While the existing theoretical literature is showing the relationship between 
unionisation structure and the union utility in closed economies, the overwhelming 
growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent decades makes it important to analyse 
this issue from an open economy perspective. With this background and motivated by the 
institutional diversity of unionisation structure and the significant growth of FDI in recent 
decades, this paper examines the relationship between unionisation structure and utility of 
the unions in an international oligopoly. 
  We consider an economy where the firms from a home (or domestic) country and 
a foreign country compete in the foreign country market. The firms in the home country 
                                                 
 
1 Under a decentralised wage setting, wages are set between a single employer and a firm-level union, 
while under a centralised wage setting, an industry-wide union negotiates a standard wage for the entire 
industry (Haucap and Wey, 2004). 
2 Ulph (1989) shows that if the firm and the workers cannot commit to a long-term contract, decentralised 
unions induce the firms to increase their investments, and may benefit the workers. As mentioned in Katz 
(1993), unions often prefer firm-level bargaining over industry-level bargaining since the former gives 
them a power advantage. Mukherjee and Pennings (2005) show that if the firms differ in terms of 
production technologies, the presence of technology licensing may make the workers better off under 
decentralised labour union. They also show the effects of unionisation on a firm’s incentive for innovation.  
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may serve the foreign country either through exports or FDI. The labour market in the 
home country is unionised, whereas the foreign labour market is perfectly competitive.   
We show that the incentive for outward FDI by the home firms is higher under a 
centralised labour union than under decentralised labour unions. Whether the wage rate 
charged by the labour unions and the union utility are higher under a centralised union is 
ambiguous. If all home firms serve the foreign country market through exports 
irrespective of the unionisation structure, their wage rates charged by the labour union 
and the union utility are higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. 
However, the wage rate charged by the labour union and the union utility may be higher 
under decentralised unions if, in equilibrium, the number of firms undertaking FDI is 
higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, and the comparison 
may depend on the competitiveness of the industry. Using an example, we show that if 
the difference between the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised and 
decentralised unions is not very large, the union utility is higher under a centralised 
(decentralised) union if the industry is sufficiently (not sufficiently) competitive.   
If the home firms undertake outward FDI, there is a loss of demand for labour in 
the home country, which tends to reduce the wage rate in the home country and may also 
be detrimental to the union utility. Since the incentive for FDI is higher under a 
centralised union, this negative effect is more likely to be higher under a centralised 
union than under decentralised unions. However, a centralised union, by internalising 
competition between separate unions, helps to raise the wage rate, thus providing a 
positive effect on the union utility. The negative effect of a centralised union is more 
likely to dominate the positive effect provided the difference between the numbers of  
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firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is sufficiently larger than under 
decentralised unions. 
We also show that if no home firm undertakes FDI irrespective of the 
unionisation structure, there is a conflict of interests between the domestic industry and 
the labour union, since the former prefers a decentralised unionisation structure, while the 
latter prefers a centralised unionisation structure. However, this conflict may not arise if 
there is more FDI under a centralised union than under decentralised unions.   
The present paper has a clear relevance in the contemporary world which shows 
that the Western European countries, where the labour unions are generally highly 
centralised, are being the world’s major foreign direct investors over the past few 
decades. UNCTAD (2006) shows that, since 1980, the EU has always been the major 
world investor experiencing a remarkable growth in outward FDI. Its outward FDI 
accounted for almost 55 per cent of the world outward FDI in 2005. 
  In contrast, while the labour markets in both the US and Japan are highly 
decentralised, their importance as a source of outward FDI have declined considerably in 
the past two decades by 24 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, and accounted for only 
16 per cent and 5 per cent in 2005.
3 Further, our result of higher utility of the union under 
decentralised unions than under a centralised union also supports the move of several 
countries such as Sweden, Australia, the former West Germany, Italy, the UK and the 
USA towards a more decentralised unionisation structure, as shown in Katz (1993). The 
OECD Jobs Study also recommends making the wages and labour costs more flexible to 
                                                 
 
3 Besides the structure of unionisation, there are several other factors such as government policies that 
affect the incentive for outward FDIs. The above statistics should be considered as an indication showing 
the possibility of higher outward FDIs in countries with a centralised union compared to countries with 
decentralised unions.   
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reflect local conditions (OECD, 1996, p. 15). The trend over the past decades towards 
more decentralised unions can also be found in OECD (2004).  
The growing policy interventions for increasing outward FDI
4 have started to 
attract attentions from researchers in recent years. Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) examine 
the preference of workers and a firm for FDI. Considering a monopolistic firm and 
decentralised labour unions, they show that both the workers and the firm share the same 
interest for FDI if there is a big degree of complimentarily between activities in the home 
and the host countries. On the other hand, conflicting interests arise if there is a big 
degree of substitutability between activities in the home and the host countries where the 
firm gains but the workers lose from FDI.  
Ishida and Matsushima (2005) examine the welfare impacts of outward FDI. In a 
duopoly market structure with decentralised unions, they show that while first FDI is 
always welfare improving, second FDI is always welfare reducing. 
However, unlike those two papers, we consider the effects of different types of 
unionisation on FDI and the union utility, thus addressing a completely different issue. 
Further, unlike Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) which determine whether home workers 
and the firm agree if the firm should undertake FDI, we examine whether both parties 
share the same preference toward the unionisation structure.  
Previously, Leahy and Montagna (2000) also show the effects of centralised and 
decentralised labour unions in presence of inward FDI. However, our paper differs from 
theirs in several important ways. First, we consider outward FDI from a country with 
unionised labour market, while they consider FDI into a country with a unionised labour 
                                                 
 
4 For example, the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service and the Japan External Trade Organization 
provide support respectively to the Canadian and Japanese firms for expanding overseas.  
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market. Hence, FDI in their analysis increases the number of firms in the unionised 
labour market, while in our analysis it reduces the number of firms in the unionised 
labour market, and may have different implications for the equilibrium outcomes. In a 
comparable situation to ours (i.e., for symmetric firms and product market competition), 
their analysis suggests that the wage rates charged by the labour unions are lower under 
decentralised unions. In contrast, we show that the wage rate charged by the labour union 
may be higher under decentralised unions when the incentive for outward FDI is higher 
under a centralised union, and if the number of firms undertaking FDI is higher under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions. Secondly, unlike the present paper, 
they do not consider the effects of unionisation structure on the union utility. Thirdly, 
they ignore exporting as an alternative to FDI and assume that the alternative payoff to 
FDI as an exogenous variable, thus ignoring the wage determination problem under 
exporting, whereas we consider both exporting and FDI, and therefore, the payoff 
alternative to FDI is endogenous in our analysis. Finally, while we consider multiple 
firms deciding on FDI and exporting, and endogenously determine the equilibrium 
number of firms undertaking FDI, they consider a single firm deciding on FDI and 
exporting, thus ignoring competition between the firms undertaking FDI and exporting. 
More generally, the present paper is related to the literature on FDI in unionised 
labour market (Bughin and Vannini, 1995, Zhao, 1995, 2001, Leahy and Montagna, 
2000, Skasen and Sorensen, 2001, Naylor and Santoni, 2003, Lommerud et al., 2003 and 
Ishida and Matsushima, 2005).
5 However, the present paper generally differs from the 
                                                 
 
5 There is another literature on international unionised oligopoly without FDI, which includes Brander and 
Spencer (1988), Naylor (1998, 1999), Straume (2002, 2003), Lommerud et al. (2006), Skaksen (2004), to 
name a few.  
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existing literature in at least two important ways. First, the existing studies consider a 
particular type of union structure rather than considering the effects of different 
unionisation structures. Second, unlike the present paper which determines the 
equilibrium number of firms undertaking FDI, the existing literature generally focuses on 
a single firm undertaking FDI.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 derives the equilibrium outcomes under different unionisation structures. 
Section 4 compares the effects of decentralised and centralised unions on the incentive 
for FDI and union utility. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model  
We consider a two-country model, which comprises of a home and a foreign country. 
There are  ) 1 (> n  firms in the home country. These firms are denoted by firm 
i H , 
i=1,2,..n. There are  ) 0 (≥ m  firms in the foreign country, and these firms are denoted by 
j F , j= 1,2,..m. We assume that the firms compete in the foreign country like Cournot 
oligopolists with homogeneous products. However, the home firms can serve the foreign 
market either through export or through FDI. We assume that FDI by any home firm 
requires a fixed investment  f .  
We assume that labour is the only factor of production and the firms are 
symmetric with respect to the production technology. For simplicity, one unit of final 
output requires one unit of labour input and the cost of labour input is equal to the wage 
rate. We assume that the labour market in the foreign country is perfectly competitive, 
and the firms producing in the foreign country face the competitive wage rate 
f w , which  
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is, for simplicity, assumed to be 0. However, the labour market in the home country is 
unionised and all the exporting home firms employ labour from the labour unions. 
Concerning the unionisation structure in the home country, which is the main focus of 
this paper, we will consider two types of unionisation structure: (i) a decentralised union 
and (ii) a centralised union. Under decentralised unions, each firm in the home country 
bargains separately with a labour union, whereas under a centralised union, all firms in 
the home country are organised under a single (or national) union, and face a uniform 
wage rate (Leahy and Montagna, 2000 and Haucap and Wey, 2004).
6 In the following 
analysis, 
i U ,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = , refers to the union that is attached to firm  i H  under the 
decentralised wage setting.  
We assume that the reservation wage rate in the home country is  h w , and is equal 
to  f w , i.e.,  0 = = f h w w . This assumption of  0 = = f h w w  is made for simplicity and in 
order to emphasise the effects of trade unions on outward FDI incentives. In particular, in 
our analysis, no home firm has the incentive to undertake FDI if the wage rate paid at 
home is not greater than the foreign wage rate. Since the labour market is unionised in the 
                                                 
 
6 There could be another possibility where a centralised union charges different wages to different firms. 
However, in our analysis, the symmetry of the firms producing in the home country would generate the 
same wage rates under this situation and under a centralised union with a uniform wage rate. Moreover, 
empirical evidence suggests that in many situations, a labour union charges a uniform wage irrespective of 
the differences between the firms. As discussed in Haucap et al. (2000 and 2001), a common feature of 
many labour markets in the continental Europe is ‘coverage extension rules’, which implies that some or all 
employment terms are made generally binding for all industry participants and not only for the members of 
unions and employers’ associations. “In Germany, for example, collective wage agreements between a 
union and an employers’ association can be made compulsory even for independent employers through so-
called Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE) … The Ministry of Labor can, on application of either unions 
or employers’ associations, use an AVE to make some or all terms of a collectively negotiated employment 
contract generally binding for an entire industry, where otherwise only those unions, employers and 
employers’ associations that have actually negotiated and signed the contract would be directly bound by it 
(§3 I TVG)” (Haucap et al., 2001). It is also noted in Haucap et al. (2001) that the number of AVEs almost 
continuously increased from 448 in 1975 to 588 in 1998. Thus, this justifies our analysis with uniform 
wage setting by the labour union.  
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home country, the assumption  0 = = f h w w  will certainly ensure higher wage rate in the 
home country than in the foreign country. Although it is possible that the wage rate in the 
home country can be higher than the foreign wage rate even if 
h w  is either greater than or 
lower than 
f w , our qualitative results will not be affected due to the simplified 
assumption of 
f h w w = . 
  As in Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Haucap et al. (2004), to show our results 
in the simplest way, we assume that the unions have full bargaining power.
7 We assume 
that the unions set the wage rate to maximise their utility (which is the wage bill in our 
analysis) and the firms hire workers according to their needs. Hence, we assume that the 
firms have the right-to-manage autonomy over employment as in the works by Bughin 
and Vannini (1995), Vannini and Bughin (2000) and López and Naylor (2004), to name a 
few. 
  We assume that the inverse market demand function in the foreign country is 
q a P − = , where the notations have usual meanings. We consider the following game. 
At stage one, the home firms decide whether to export or undertake FDI. We assume that 
the home firms take decision on export and FDI sequentially.
8 At stage two, the union(s) 
in the home country determines the wage rate subject to the unionisation structure (i.e., 
centralised or decentralised). At stage three, all firms take their output decisions 
simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward 
induction.  
                                                 
 
7 For earlier works on monopolistic labour unions, we refer to Dunlop (1944) and Oswald (1982). 
8 If the home firms take decision on export and FDI simultaneously, this may generate multiple equilibria 
about the foreign investment decision, which can be eliminated if the home firms decide on export and FDI 
sequentially. Since the possibility of multiple equilibria does not add any new insight to our analysis, we 
consider sequential move of the home firms for FDI.  
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3. Export vs. FDI  
3.1. Export by all home firms 




hi i hi aqw q π =− − ,  n i ,..., 1 = ,       (1) 
where 
x
hi q  represents export by firm 
i H  and 
x u w
,  is the wage rate subjected to the type of 
union setting. In the following analysis, we will use the superscripts c and d  to denote 
the outcomes under centralised and decentralised unions respectively.   
 The  profit  of  firm  j F  is equal to:  
   ()
xx
fjf j aq q π =− ,  1,..., j m =        (2) 
where 
x
fj q  denotes the output of firm  j F . 
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9      (5) 
3.1.1. A centralised union 
If there is a centralised union in the home country, the labour union chooses the uniform 
wage rate for the home firms. Therefore, the labour union in the home country chooses 
the wage rate to maximise the following expression:  
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3.1.2. Decentralised unions 
Under the decentralised wage setting, the ith union chooses its wage rate to maximise its 
utility. Therefore, the ith union chooses its wage rate to maximise the following 
expression: 
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Maximising (9) with respect to 
, dx




n ww w == , due to the symmetry 










. Hence, the equilibrium outputs and profits are:  
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3.2. FDI by k  home firms 
Let us now consider the situation under FDI by some home firms. Assume that k  home 
firms undertake FDI and the remaining home firms export. Hence, the profit of each of 
the k  home firms undertaking FDI and each of the foreign firms is  
  ()
ff
hi hi aq q f π =− −,  k i ,..., 1 =                       (12) 
  ()
f f
fjf j aq q π =− .                         (13) 
  The profit of each of the remaining  ) ( k n − home firms, who are exporting to the 
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ht ,  n k t ,..., 1 + = .                 (16) 
 
3.2.1. A centralised union 
Since a centralised union chooses uniform wage rate, it chooses the wage rate to 
maximise the following expression:  
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3.2.2. Decentralised unions 
Under decentralised unions, the tth union,  n k t ,..., 1 + = , chooses the wage rate 
f d
t w
,  to 
maximise its utility. Hence, the tth union, chooses 
f d
t w
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. Therefore, the equilibrium outputs and profits are: 
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4. The incentive for FDI 
4.1. The incentive for FDI under a centralised unionisation structure 
If there is a centralised union, FDI is profitable up to the k th home firm provided that:  
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,              (30) 
where  ,1 , ck ck f ff + << . 
The critical value  , ck f  ( ,1 ck f +  respectively) represents the difference between the 
gross profits under FDI and under export for the k th firm ( ) 1 ( + k th firm respectively) 
when  ) 1 ( − k  firms (k  firms respectively) have decided to undertake FDI. If these critical 
values increase, it implies that the gross profit differences between FDI and exporting 
also increase, thus increasing the incentive for outward FDI by more firms. 
  Similarly, under decentralised unions, FDI is profitable up to the k th home firm 
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               (32) 
where  ,1 , dk dk f ff + << .  
  Before proceeding to the discussion on the effects of different unionisation 
structures on the incentive for FDI, let us first determine the impact of different types of 
unionisation on the wage rates in the home country. This will help us to see the effects of 
unionisation structures on the incentive for FDI. If all the home firms export, or the same 
number of firms undertake FDI and exporting under different types of unionisation, their 
wage rates charged by the labour union is obviously higher under a centralised union than 
under decentralised unions. However, we can show that if the number of FDI firms under 
a centralised union is higher than the number of FDI firms under decentralised unions, 
the wage rates in the home country may be higher under decentralised unions than under 
a centralised union. For example, if all home firms export under decentralised unions, the 
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We find that 
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, , >  provided  n k > +1 2 , and it is easy to see that this may hold. For  
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example, if  2 = n , and  ,1 ,1 dc f ff << , FDI occurs only under a centralised union and only 
a single home firm undertakes FDI. Hence, we have  1 = k , and the condition  n k > +1 2 
is satisfied, which implies that the wage rates in the home country is higher under 
decentralised unions than under a centralised union. 
  The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: (i) If all home firms export or the same number of home firms undertake 
FDI irrespective of the unionisation structure, the wage rates in the home country is 
higher under centralised union than under decentralised unions. 
(ii) If the number of home firms undertaking FDI is higher under a centralised union than 
under decentralised unions, the wage rate in the home country may be higher under 
decentralised unions than under a centralised union. 
 
  Let us now consider the effects of different unionisation structures on the 
incentive for FDI. We find that  0 ) ( ) (
, , , ,








k k d k c f f π π π π . The reason 
for this is as follows. Given the number of firms undertaking FDI, the wage rate in the 
home country is always lower under decentralised unions than under a centralised union. 
Therefore, if the k th firm exports, it faces a lower wage rate under decentralised unions 
than under a centralised union. If the k th firm exports, its competitors are as follows: m  
foreign firms and  ) 1 ( − k home firms undertaking FDI, each with wage rate 0, and 
) ( k n −  domestic firms exporting, each with a lower wage rate under decentralised unions 
than under a centralised union. Since the effect of a lower own wage rate under 
decentralised unions compared to a centralised union dominates the effect of the  
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competitors’ lower wage rate, the profit of the k th firm is higher under decentralised 
unions than under a centralised union, if the k th firm exports. On the other hand, if the 
k th firm undertakes FDI when  ) 1 ( − k  home firms have decided to undertake FDI, the 
wage rate of the k th firm is 0, whereas the  ) ( k n −  remaining exporting firms’ marginal 
cost is lower under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, thus reducing the 
profit of the k th firm under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union when 
the k th firm undertakes FDI.  
  Hence, the following proposition follows immediately. 
  
Proposition 2: There are fixed costs of FDI (viz.,  k c k d f f f , , < < ) such that relatively 
more home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union than under decentralised 
unions. 
 
In other words, Proposition 2 implies that the incentive for FDI under a 
centralised union is always higher than under decentralised unions. 
4.2. Union rent 
Let us now determine the impacts of different unionisation structures on union rents. To 
start with, we consider the situation where neither home firms undertake FDI irrespective 
of the unionisation structure. In other words, we consider the situation where the fixed 
cost of FDI,  f , is such that  f f f c d < < 1 , 1 , , and all the home firms serve the foreign 
market through exports. In this situation, the comparison of the union rents under 




x d x c UR UR
, , >           
since   2
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.                           (33) 
Hence, the union is always better off under a centralised union than under decentralised 
unions if all home firms always export irrespective of the unionisation structure. This 
result is in line with the existing works such as Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Davidson 
(1988), which suggest that if the workers are sufficiently substitutable, they are better off 
under a centralised union than under decentralised unions, since the former allows the 
union to internalise competition between different unions. 
  Let us now consider the situation where not all home firms are exporting 
irrespective of the unionisation structure.
10 Given the result of the previous subsection, 
which shows that the FDI incentive is higher under a centralised union than under 
decentralised unions, we now determine the situation where neither home firms undertake 
FDI under decentralised unions but k  home firms undertake FDI under a centralised 
union. Therefore, the fixed cost of FDI is such that  k c d f f f , 1 , < < . In this situation, the 
comparison of the union rents shows that: 
    
,, /
cf dx UR UR ><          
provided  that  2 ) 1 2 (
) (
/











.                       (34) 
It is clear from (34) that, given  k c d f f f , 1 , < <  , as k  increases, it is more likely that 
x d f c UR UR
, , < . Hence, the workers are more likely to be better off under decentralised 
                                                 
 
10 It is trivial to note that if all the home firms undertake FDI irrespective of the unionisation structure, 
union rents are always zero, and the workers in the home country are indifferent between both types of 
unionisation structures.   
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unions if the cost of FDI is not very small (so that FDI is not profitable under 
decentralised unions), but it is small enough to encourage a significant number of home 
firms to undertake FDI under a centralised union.  
  Given that the fixed cost of FDI is such that k  home firms are undertaking FDI, 
we can find the condition on the market structure (i.e., the number of total firms in the 
industry) such that the home workers are better off under decentralised unions than under 
a centralised union. As an example, if we assume that nm =  and the fixed cost of FDI is 
such that  1 , 1 , c d f f f < <  (i.e., FDI occurs only under a centralised union and only one 
firm undertakes FDI), the home workers are better off under decentralised unions than 
under a centralised union, i.e., 
,, dx cf UR UR >  provided  19 n ≤ . Note that, for  19 ≤ = m n , 
the interval  ) , ( 1 , 1 , c d f f  is non-empty.  
  In general, the effect of centralisation on union rent depends on two opposing 
forces: (i) the change in the wage rate, and (ii) the change in the demand of labour. On 
the one hand, given the labour demand, centralisation generates a positive effect to the 
union rent by increasing the wage rate. On the other hand, there is a negative effect 
associated with a centralisation as this may cause outward FDI, and reduces labour 
demand in the home country. The magnitude of this negative effect depends on the 
number of firms undertaking FDI and the competitiveness of the industry, which is given 
by the total number of home and foreign firms. 
  Assuming the same number of home and foreign firms in the industry, the 
above example suggests that if the industry is very competitive (i.e.,  19 n > ), the output 
of each firm and therefore, the labour demand by each firm is not very significant. Hence, 
in this situation FDI by a home firm under a centralised union is not very costly for the  
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union rent; rather the positive effect of a higher wage rate under a centralised union 
becomes important. Thus, in this situation, the worker is better off under a centralised 
union than under decentralised unions. But, if the market is not so competitive (i.e., 
19 n ≤ ), the loss of labour demand under a centralised union due to FDI dominates the 
higher wage rate effect under a centralised union. Thus, the worker is better off under 
decentralised unions than under a centralised union.    
  It should be noted that if the fixed cost of FDI falls below  1 , d f , we observe FDI 
even under a decentralised wage setting. However, Proposition 2 suggests that the 
possibility of FDI by more firms is higher under a centralised union than under 
decentralised unions. This implies that labour demand in the home country due to 
outward FDI is likely to fall more under a centralised union than under decentralised 
unions. Therefore, the net effect of outward FDI on the union rents when we observe FDI 
under both types of unionisation structures will depend on the difference between the 
number of home firms undertaking FDI under different unionisation structures and the 
competitiveness of the industry.     
  The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: (i) If all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure, the 
union rent is higher under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. 
(ii) If outward FDI occurs only under a centralised union, the possibility of higher union 
rent under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union increases with the 
number of home firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union.  
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(iii) In general, if more home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union than under 
decentralised unions, whether the union rent is higher under the former or the latter 
unionisation structure depends on the difference between the number of home firms 
undertaking FDI under different unionisation structures and the competitiveness of the 
industry. 
 
4.3. Conflict of interests between the union and the domestic industry 
As mentioned in Katz (1993), though history demonstrates that the unions prefer 
centralised bargaining and the employers prefer decentralised bargaining, the parties’ 
preferences are not always so clearly ordered. Furthermore, Katz (1993) argues that the 
unions may prefer firm-level bargaining than industry-level bargaining because the 
former gives them a power advantage. We will provide a different reason for the non-
existence of a conflict of interest between the firms and the labour union. We will show 
that if the unionisation structure affects the incentive for FDI, there may not be a conflict 
of interest between the firms and the labour union, and both the union and the domestic 
industry
11 may prefer decentralised unions than a centralised union.   
  Let us first consider the situation where all home firms export irrespective of the 
unionisation structure. As shown in Proposition 3(i), in this situation, the workers are 
better off under a centralised union. In this situation, we find that the domestic industry 
prefers decentralised unions than a centralised union, i.e., 
,, dx cx π π > , as 
                                                 
 
11 Note that we are considering the domestic industry, i.e., all the domestic firms together, rather than a 
particular domestic firm. It is possible that though there may not be a conflict between the domestic 
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, since   1 > n .                   (35) 
Therefore, if all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure, the labour 
union and the domestic industry reveal conflicting interests.  
  Let us now consider the situation where the number of home firms undertaking 
FDI depends on the unionisation structure. We will show that, in this situation, there may 
not be a conflict of interests between the union and the domestic industry. Considering 
the situation where no home firms undertake FDI under decentralised unions, while k  
home firms undertake FDI under a centralised union, the domestic industry is better 
(worse) off under a centralised union than under decentralised unions provided: 
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Similar to the example shown in subsection 4.2, if we consider the situation with  m n =  
and  1 = k  under a centralised union, while there is no FDI under decentralised unions, 
i.e., considering the fixed cost of FDI as  1 , 1 , c d f f f < < , we find that the left hand side of 
(36) is lower than the right hand side. Therefore, in this situation, the domestic industry is 
better off under decentralised unions than under a centralised union. 
  The reason for the above finding is as follows. The firm undertaking FDI faces a 
lower marginal cost of the production, which helps to increase its gross profit (i.e., the 
profit including the cost of FDI). However, FDI by a firm reduces the profits of the 
remaining exporting firms by exposing them to more intense competition from the firm  
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undertaking FDI, though FDI by a home firm may reduce the wage rate of the remaining 
home firms under the centralised union compared to their wage rates under decentralised 
unions with no FDI. Furthermore, the cost of FDI creates a negative impact on the profit 
of the firm undertaking FDI. On balance, the profit of the domestic industry is lower 
under a centralised union than under decentralised unions. 
  Considering the example of subsection 4.2, i.e.,  m n =  and  1 , 1 , c d f f f < < , and 
taking together the preferences of both the home country labour union and the domestic 
industry under the given parameter configurations, we can see that both the union and the 
home firms share a common interest toward decentralised unions if  19 n ≤  (i.e., if the 
industry is not so competitive), thus creating no conflict of interests between the union 
and the domestic industry.  
  The above discussion leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: (i) If all home firms export irrespective of the unionisation structure, 
there exists a conflict of interest between the union and the domestic industry. Labour 
union prefers a centralised union while the domestic industry prefers decentralised 
unions. 
(ii) There may not be a conflict of interest between the labour union and the domestic 
industry about the choice of unionisation structure if the number of firms undertaking 
FDI under a centralised union is higher than the number of firms undertaking FDI under 




It is often argued that if there are highly substitutable workers, labour is better off under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions. We suggest that this may not be true in 
an open economy with FDI.  
  We find that the domestic firms have higher incentives for outward FDI under a 
centralised union compared to decentralised unions. Concerning the wage rates charged 
by the labour unions and the utility of the unions, if all home firms export irrespective of 
the unionisation structure, the wage rates and the union utility are higher under a 
centralised union.  If the number of firms undertaking FDI under a centralised union is 
higher than that of under decentralised unions, the wage rates and the union utility may 
be higher under decentralised unions than under a centralised union, and the comparison 
may depend on the competitiveness of the industry.  
  We also show that if the number of firms undertaking FDI is higher under a 
centralised union than under decentralised unions, there may not be a conflict of interest 
between the labour union and the domestic industry, and both the union and the domestic 
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